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ARTICLE
Neurons and normativity: A critique of Greene’s notion of 
unfamiliarity
Michael T. Dale
Department of Philosophy, The University of Texas at Austin, Austin, Texas, USA
ABSTRACT
In his article “Beyond Point-and-Shoot Morality,” Joshua 
Greene argues that the empirical findings of cognitive neu-
roscience have implications for ethics. Specifically, he con-
tends that we ought to trust our manual conscious 
reasoning system more than our automatic emotional sys-
tem when confronting unfamiliar problems; and because 
cognitive neuroscience has shown that consequentialist 
judgments are generated by the manual system and deon-
tological judgments are generated by the automatic sys-
tem, we ought to trust the former more than the latter when 
facing unfamiliar moral problems. In the present article, 
I analyze one of the premises of Greene’s argument. In 
particular, I ask what exactly an unfamiliar problem is, and 
whether moral problems can be classified as unfamiliar. 
After exploring several different possible interpretations of 
familiarity and unfamiliarity, I conclude that the concepts 
are too problematic to be philosophically compelling and, 
thus, should be abandoned.
ARTICLE HISTORY 
Received 10 September 2018  








Over the last two decades, the philosopher-turned-neuroscientist Joshua 
Greene has argued that the empirical findings of psychology and cog-
nitive neuroscience have implications for ethics. Greene has published 
across a wide spectrum of journals,1 and thus has used a variety of 
techniques, but the general thrust of his thesis has always remained the 
same: recent empirical findings in the brain sciences not only support 
the consequentialist outlook, they also undermine deontology. For 
Greene, a characteristically consequentialist judgment focuses on the 
overall best consequences, often ignoring any strict rules or duties.2 
A characteristically deontological judgment, on the other hand, is one 
that puts much heavier emphasis on such rules, rights, duties, and 
obligations. To assert that one ought not break a rule, no matter 
what, is to make a characteristically deontological judgment.3,4
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While Greene uses a few different strategies to support his thesis,5 this 
article will look closely at only one of his arguments. Specifically, I will be 
focusing on an argument put forward in Greene’s article entitled “Beyond 
Point-and Shoot Morality.” This argument contends that we ought to trust 
our manual conscious reasoning system more than our automatic emotional 
system when confronting unfamiliar* problems;6 and because cognitive 
neuroscience has shown that consequentialist judgments are generated by 
the manual system and deontological judgments are generated by the auto-
matic system,7 we ought to lean toward consequentialism when facing 
unfamiliar moral problems (Greene, 2014). In the present article, 
I critically examine the second premise of this argument.8 In particular, 
I ask what exactly an unfamiliar* problem is and whether moral problems 
can be classified as unfamiliar*. After exploring several different possible 
interpretations of familiarity* and unfamiliarity*, I conclude that the con-
cepts are too problematic to be philosophically compelling, and thus should 
be abandoned.
2. The unfamiliarity* argument
Greene begins by applying the dual-process model of the brain (Evans & 
Stanovich, 2013) to the moral domain. This dual-process theory of moral 
decision-making maintains that there are two overarching neural systems 
(which are each made up of a group of smaller neural subsystems) under-
lying moral judgment: one associated with emotion, and the other asso-
ciated with deliberate conscious reasoning (Greene, 2014, pp. 698–708).9 
The emotional system generates automatic responses to specific stimuli: 
when I see someone harm an innocent person, sometimes I have an auto-
matic emotional response that the action is wrong without understanding 
exactly why I think it is wrong, that is, without the influence of my conscious 
reasoning.10 These responses – or emotional intuitions – are part of our 
automatic system, and they exist for reasons of efficiency (Greene, 2014, 
p. 696, 2013). If a child is drowning, it is not advantageous for a bystander to 
consciously consider all the reasons for and against rescuing the child – time 
is of the essence. Thus, it is best if the bystander has an automatic emotional 
reaction that compels her to jump in without thinking. Similarly, if you see 
a large carnivore approaching you, it would be better to have an automatic 
flight response than a conscious deliberation about what to do.
However, the efficiency of this emotional system has its disadvantages. In 
situations in which it is best to actually think through the different options, 
these emotional intuitions can lead us astray. Indeed, we may need a manual 
system to override our emotional responses, and this manual system is our 
conscious reasoning. With regard to the drowning child, perhaps there is 
absolutely no way to save the child, and if the bystander were to jump in, she 
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would die too. In such a situation, perhaps it is best to let the child drown, 
even if our emotions are telling us to jump in. Thus, sometimes it is better to 
engage our flexible manual system to countermand our efficient automatic 
system.
With this theory in the background, Greene then continues on to his 
main premises. The first premise (P1) maintains that we ought to use our 
manual system when dealing with unfamiliar*11 situations and problems 
because of its superior reliability (Greene, 2014, pp. 714–715).12 Specifically, 
because our automatic system can only adequately respond to situations 
that it is either conditioned to respond to or genetically programmed to 
respond to, there is a significant chance that it will not competently address 
a novel situation. Now, contrast this with our manual system, that is, our 
conscious reasoning. In novel circumstances, our manual system is able to 
use its general reasoning abilities to try to figure out what the best response 
is. Admittedly, it will probably take longer than the automatic system to 
come to a decision, but the fact that it can carefully analyze all the aspects of 
the situation makes it overall the best neural network to use when dealing 
with unfamiliarity*.
Greene then argues (P2) that many important moral problems can 
probably be classified as unfamiliar* if we are to define unfamiliarity* as 
something with which we have “inadequate evolutionary, cultural, or per-
sonal experience” (Greene, 2014, p. 714). Global poverty, climate change, 
terrorism, and trolley dilemmas are all problems that are too new for our 
genes and culture to have automatic responses to address them adequately 
(Greene, 2014, p. 716). Of course, as Greene admits, we can’t know with 
absolute certainty that such problems will qualify as unfamiliar* because we 
don’t (yet) know everything about our cultural and evolutionary inheri-
tances. However, if we are to make “educated guesses” with this definition in 
mind, he “strongly suspects” that that these moral problems – and many 
others – will qualify as unfamiliar* (Greene, 2014, p. 716).
At this point, Greene’s normative case is starting to take shape. If our 
manual system is more reliable than our automatic system when making 
decisions about unfamiliar moral problems, then we have reason to trust the 
moral judgments that are generated by our conscious reasoning more than 
the judgments generated by our emotions. Now, how do we know which 
judgments are generated by which system? Greene turns to the field of 
cognitive neuroscience to answer this question, and here we see his third 
premise (P3) emerge. Greene and his colleagues conducted an fMRI study to 
investigate participants’ brain functioning while making judgments about 
different types of moral dilemmas, and the results were striking. First, it was 
revealed that deontological judgments are generated by our emotional 
processing system because subjects who made deontological judgments 
about moral situations showed heightened activity in a network of neural 
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regions associated with emotion (the ventromedial prefrontal cortex, the 
precuneus, the posterior cingulate cortex, the superior temporal sulcus, the 
inferior parietal lobe, and the amygdala). Second, it was shown that con-
sequentialist judgments are generated by our conscious reasoning system 
because subjects who made a consequentialist judgment about a moral 
situation showed heightened neural activity in a collection of regions asso-
ciated with conscious reasoning (the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, the 
inferior parietal lobe, and the posterior cingulate cortex) (Greene, 2008; 
Greene et al., 2004, 2001). Now, let’s formalize Greene’s argument:
Background model: the dual-process theory of moral judgment. Some moral judg-
ments are generated by an automatic, emotion-based system, while others are gener-
ated by a manual, conscious reasoning-based system.
P1: We ought to trust our manual system more than our automatic system 
when facing unfamiliar* problems.
P2: Many important moral problems are unfamiliar* problems.
P3: Deontological judgments are generated by an emotional neural network, 
while consequentialist judgments are generated by a conscious reasoning 
neural network.
From these three premises, he concludes that because our deontological 
judgments are generated by an emotional neural network, they are an 
output of our automatic system, and because our consequentialist judg-
ments are generated by a conscious reasoning neural network, they are an 
output of our manual system (C1); and because we ought to trust our 
manual system more than our automatic system when making decisions 
about unfamiliar moral problems, we ought to trust our consequentialist 
judgments more than our deontological judgments when making decisions 
about unfamiliar moral problems (C2) (Greene, 2014, pp. 716–725).13 To be 
clear, Greene isn’t asserting that we should never make deontological judg-
ments. Instead, he is saying that we have a fairly convincing reason for why 
we should, in general, trust our consequentialist inclinations more when we 
are faced with unfamiliar moral problems.
3. A first pass
The key to Greene’s second premise is the concept of unfamiliarity*. If he 
can come up with an understanding of unfamiliarity* such that many 
important moral problems qualify as unfamiliar*, then, perhaps,14 he may 
be off and running toward his normative conclusion (C2). However, as 
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Paulo (2018, p. 17) points out, Greene’s conception of unfamiliarity* is 
ambiguous due to its lack of technical explication. The following clues are 
all that we are given. First, as mentioned in the last section, Greene states 
that unfamiliar* problems are those “with which we have inadequate evolu-
tionary, cultural, or personal experience” (Greene, 2014, p. 714). Familiar 
problems*, on the other hand, are those that we can deal adequately enough 
with our evolutionarily, culturally, and personally instilled automatic 
responses. Greene (2014) writes:
Automatic settings can function well only when they have been shaped by trial-and- 
error experience. This may be the experience of our biological ancestors, as reflected in, 
for example, a genetic predisposition to fear snakes. Our automatic settings may be 
shaped by the experience of our cultural “ancestors,” as reflected in a fear of guns, despite 
one’s having never been harmed by one. Finally, our automatic settings are shaped by 
our own trial and error, as when one learns to fear hot stoves by touching them. These 
three mechanisms – genetic transmission, cultural transmission, and learning from 
personal experience – are the only mechanisms known to endow human automatic 
cognitive processes with the information they need to function well. (p. 714)
Therefore, when our genetic, cultural, and personal predispositions are 
enough to adequately address a problem, then we can classify that problem 
as familiar*, and when they are not enough to address the problem, we can 
classify it as unfamiliar*.
Problems that probably fall into the latter category, according to Greene, 
are those that have come about through recent cultural developments – he 
mentions climate change, global terrorism, global poverty, and bioethics 
(Greene, 2014, p. 716). In his book Moral Tribes, he also mentions problems 
related to big government versus small government, the role of religion in 
public life, abortion, stem cell research, the teaching of evolution in public 
schools, and the regulation of the financial industry (Greene, 2013, pp. 99, 
348).15 All of these problems arose relatively recently in our evolutionary 
and cultural experience, and thus, it makes sense that we wouldn’t have 
preprogrammed responses developed through trial and error that can ade-
quately address them.
What about familiar* problems? Greene describes problems such as 
poverty, disease, war, exploitation, and personal violence as “age-old,” so 
I assume these would be classified as familiar* problems.16 In the case of 
personal violence, when someone physically attacks us, we have specific 
responses (shaped by evolution, culture, and our personal life history) that 
are automatically triggered to address the situation – for example, protect-
ing our head, running away, fighting back, and so on – and since our 
automatic responses are usually enough to address familiar* problems 
such as these, our manual system is not needed.
However, if Greene is going to use familiarity* as a technical term – and 
a technical term upon which his entire normative conclusion rests, no less – 
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then it’s going to need more explanation.17 To begin to understand why, let’s 
consider exactly how much evolutionary, cultural, and personal experience is 
necessary for a problem to be considered familiar*. One possibility is “even 
a little bit,” which is to say, for a problem to be classified as unfamiliar*, there 
needs to be no preprogrammed genetic, cultural, or personal responses that 
are aimed at addressing it. However, this cannot be the case because every 
problem requires at least some preprogrammed responses if we are going to 
have any chance of addressing it. Take Greene’s example of driving a car. 
When we first approach learning how to drive, according to Greene, it is an 
unfamiliar* problem because we have never driven a car before and because 
there is no reason for driving to be part of our genetic inheritance (Greene, 
2014, p. 714). However, there is actually a significant amount of evolutionarily 
and culturally instilled information and processing that is needed to even 
approach such a problem. Coordinating hand and eye movements, object 
tracking, seeing, recognizing distance, reading signs; these are just some of the 
evolutionarily and culturally instilled abilities that are engaged in a way that 
enables us to solve the problem of driving. Even the ability to learn new skills 
is almost certainly an evolutionarily instilled capacity.18
Therefore, it cannot be that for a problem to be unfamiliar*, it needs to be 
completely automatic-response free. It must be that it requires some auto-
matic responses but also some manual responses – but where exactly should 
Greene draw the line? Let’s consider driving again. As mentioned, many of 
the capacities that enable us to (learn how to) drive are instilled automatic 
responses, but there is something new about driving. Our hominid ancestors 
didn’t drive (probably), so there would be no genetic inheritance specific to 
driving. It’s also new to our personal life history, since it is our first time 
driving – though one could argue that playing driving and using car toys as 
a child is in some way practice for adult driving. The cultural inheritance 
question, though, is more complicated. As Greene uses the example of driving 
a car as an unfamiliar* problem, we can assume he believes that there are no 
culturally instilled automatic responses that are used to address the problem. 
However, in the block quote above, he describes our fear of guns as culturally 
instilled. This is interesting because guns are a relatively new cultural inven-
tion, just as cars are, and if the fear we feel when seeing a gun is instilled in us 
by cultural inheritance (which seems correct), then what about learning to 
drive? The generations before us have driven, so why is it not the case that 
they have passed down norms to us about driving a car, such as watching out 
for other cars and pedestrians, making sure the gauges are all working, 
braking when we see traffic up ahead, and so on? Indeed, if we fear guns 
because adults have taught us that we should fear them, and this has led to 
a fear response to all stimuli that look like guns, then perhaps we can drive – 
at least partly – because we have ridden in cars growing up, played with toy 
cars, been told what to do while in cars, and so on.
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It’s at this point that I begin to lose sight of how driving a car can be seen 
as an unfamiliar* problem, and this makes it difficult to use the example to 
pinpoint exactly how many (or what kind of) automatic responses are 
needed before a problem becomes familiar*. One possible route is to main-
tain that the fear response we adopt about guns is simple, straightforward, 
and reliably manifested. Driving a car, on the other hand, is complicated, 
and while it may be true that some of the capacities used to learn how to 
drive are instilled by evolution and others are instilled by our cultural 
experience, the act itself – with all the different capacities and abilities 
organized in a particular way – is new.
However, isn’t that the case for almost every decision that we make, for 
even if we are facing a very similar decision that we had to make a few 
months earlier (or our ancestors had to make a few millennia earlier), we are 
encountering it at a different time, and thus, with a different set of moods, 
emotions, cultural knowledge, recent experiences, and environmental cir-
cumstances. Going back to the “age-old” problems that Greene discusses, 
it’s true that our ancestors have been dealing with disease for millions of 
years, but in almost every decision that we make about disease (even if it is 
itself an “age-old” disease), we still need to consider the particular circum-
stances (e.g., the person’s history, financial burdens, the state of the art of the 
medical field, the overall medicinal approach, etc.). Which is all to say, in 
almost every decision that we make, our brains are never dealing with the 
same inputs nor is the context ever the same. Thus, it is almost never the 
case that we have made the exact same decision before.19
Therefore, we are currently at a strange spot with regard to the example of 
driving a car. As we’ve seen, it’s possible to argue that many of the capacities 
that are required to drive a car are, in fact, evolutionarily, culturally, and 
personally instilled, which leaves only a little room for the manual capacities 
that supposedly make the problem unfamiliar*; and that would mean that 
only a small amount of manual responses is necessary for a problem to be 
classified as unfamiliar*. However, at the same time, every decision needs at 
least a tiny amount of manual response due to different contextual issues, 
which means that we are dealing with a difference between a familiar* and 
an unfamiliar* problem that is almost certainly too small to be useful for 
classification.
However, maybe we have gotten off track due to the complicated nature 
of driving a car. Indeed, maybe it’s not a good example to use when 
attempting to find a technical definition of the concept of familiarity* after 
all, and Greene only meant it as a way to help us begin to have a general 
understanding of the notion. Let’s now turn to some of the more norma-
tively loaded – and thus ultimately more topical – examples. Perhaps 
through exploring them we can find a more compelling way to understand 
the notions of familiarity* and unfamiliarity*.
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4. Moral problems
Greene (2014, p. 716) “strongly suspect[s]” that the bizarre and unrealistic 
trolley problem qualifies as unfamiliar*.20 Again, there does seem to be 
something that is intuitively true about this. If we are considering the 
dilemma for the first time, it is new to us and we need to take a moment 
to figure out what we think the best action is. Yet, it remains difficult to use 
this example to help develop a technical understanding of familiarity* and 
unfamiliarity*. For one, it’s again true that many aspects of the problem are 
familiar* to us. We know what all the objects in the scenario are (e.g., 
trolleys) due to our cultural heritage; we also know what it means to harm 
someone, to kill someone, and to save someone, probably as a result of some 
combination of our genes and personal life history. We are even able to 
imagine what it would (roughly) feel like to carry out a certain decision (e.g., 
push the large man onto the tracks).
At the same time, though, there is something different about approaching 
a moral dilemma than attempting to drive a car. We saw in the last section 
that the driving example became difficult to classify once we considered all 
of the culturally instilled information we have about driving before we ever 
get behind the wheel. In the trolley problem, however, the situation seems to 
be a bit clearer cut. While we are familiar* with many aspects of the dilemma 
(otherwise, we would probably not have any way to even understand it or 
begin to think about it), neither we nor our genes have needed to face this 
specific dilemma before; which is all to say, the pieces of the dilemma are 
familiar* but the final deliberation about what to do in the situation is not 
evolutionarily, culturally, or personally instilled, and is thus novel. By way of 
analogy, consider the construction of a new car.21 While all of the materials 
and the principles of engineering are familiar to the builders, the final 
product is something new, distinctive, and (at least the first time they 
build one) unfamiliar*.
With this new way of considering the issue, we may be able to clear up 
some of the confusions we were having before about learning to drive. 
While it is still the case that we are (genetically and culturally) familiar 
with many aspects of driving before we ever try it (indeed, even more so 
than the trolley dilemma because of all of the times we are exposed to 
driving while growing up), the act of driving itself is something novel to 
us the first time we attempt to do it – and that is why it takes a significant 
period of time before we can master the skill. Again, the components are 
familiar* but the activity itself is a combination of all of the familiar* 
components into a final product that is novel and unfamiliar*. At this 
point, we may have the beginning of our sought-out definition. 
Specifically, for a problem to be unfamiliar*, we can be familiar* with 
many of the capacities and skills necessary to solve the problem, but the 
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specific way in which the capacities and skills are applied must be novel in 
such a way that we need to use effortful manual processing to solve it.
However, how much effortful manual processing are we talking about 
here? As mentioned in the previous section, all decisions require some 
amount of effortful processing due to the different context one faces from 
one moment to the next. Could Greene maintain that there is some minimal 
amount of manual processing that is acceptable for familiar* problems, but 
after this minimal threshold has been surpassed, the problem then becomes 
unfamiliar*? Perhaps, but it’s difficult to see how such a threshold could be 
convincingly established. To see why, let’s consider the most likely way 
Greene would go about establishing it. As I explained in the second section, 
Greene contends that there are two general systems inside the brain: one 
associated with emotion (made up of the ventromedial prefrontal cortex, the 
precuneus, the posterior cingulate cortex, the superior temporal sulcus, the 
inferior parietal lobe, and the amygdala) and the other with conscious 
reasoning (made up of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, the inferior par-
ietal lobe, and the posterior cingulate cortex). Could Greene use this neu-
rological portrait to come up with his much-needed threshold? That is, 
could he claim that a certain amount of neural processing in the area of the 
brain associated with conscious reasoning is the necessary amount to 
establish unfamiliarity*?
Again, we have the hint of possibility here, but once the neurological 
evidence is considered (as it has been by Bluhm, 2014; Berker, 2009; 
Christensen & Gomila, 2012; Dean, 2010; Klein, 2011; Moll & De Oliveira- 
Souza, 2007; Prinz, 2016), it becomes difficult to get on board with such 
a possibility. Consider first the makeup of Greene’s conscious reasoning 
system. As Greene himself acknowledges (Greene et al., 2004, p. 397), the 
posterior cingulate cortex (PCC) is primarily associated with emotion 
(Kober et al., 2008; Maddock, 1999; Maddock et al., 2003). Moreover, the 
inferior parietal lobe (IPL) is linked to both conscious reasoning and emo-
tion. Interestingly, this is again not contradicted by Greene’s own research, 
as he includes the IPL in both his conscious reasoning system and his 
emotional system (Greene et al., 2004, pp. 391–392). Furthermore, Borg 
et al. (2008) found that the IPL showed heightened activity when subjects 
made moral judgments about heavily emotional situations, such as incest. 
On top of this, there is even evidence that the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex 
(DLPFC) helps adjudicate between conflicting inputs, some of which have 
been shown to be primarily emotion based (Klein, 2011). Thus, it cannot be 
claimed that these regions make up a conscious reasoning-based neural 
network.
There are similar problems with Greene’s emotional neural system. We 
already know that the PCC is associated with emotion, so there is no 
controversy there. However, both the precuneus (PC) and the superior 
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temporal sulcus (STS) are linked to many nonemotional tasks that play 
a part in conscious reasoning. Specifically, the PC plays a role in processing 
visual images, memory, awareness, consciousness, and taking a first-person 
perspective (Cavanna & Trimble, 2006; Vogeley & Fink, 2003; Vogeley et al., 
2004; Vogt & Laureys, 2005). All this has led to a meta-analysis of emotional 
processing to not even include the PC in any of the major emotional neural 
networks (Kober et al., 2008, p. 14). This is not to say that the PC is not at all 
associated with emotion. Greene is right that it is to a certain extent, but the 
empirical evidence is still too indefinite, and therefore, it’s difficult to 
confidently claim that it is part of an emotional system.
Similarly, the STS has been shown to be important not only in emotion, 
but also in audiovisual tasks, theory of mind, and face recognition (Hein & 
Knight, 2008). Could it be the case that the STS shows activity during 
deontological judgments (which, according to Greene, are emotionally 
generated) because subjects are thinking about the large man’s perspective? 
We simply do not know, and therefore, the evidence is unclear either way. 
Furthermore, patients who have suffered lesioning in the VMPFC lose 
significant ability in decision making, planning, and understanding and 
following social rules, which are all linked to conscious reasoning 
(Damasio, 1994, pp. 54–79). Finally, even though the amygdala is popularly 
known as an emotional center, recent evidence has linked it to cognitive 
processes such as attention and associative learning (Holland & Gallagher, 
1999; Pessoa, 2008). Thus, if we also take into account the previous analysis 
on the IPL, only one of the six regions of Greene’s emotional neural network 
(i.e., the PCC) is solely associated with emotion.
Importantly, Greene and his colleagues acknowledge some of these incon-
sistencies and attempt to explain them. In particular, they argue that the PCC 
might be activated during consequentialist judgments because it is playing a role 
in motivation (Greene et al., 2004). That is, the DLPFC and the IPL are the 
systems doing the actual cognitive processing; the PCC is just there to motivate 
the subject the put forward the moral judgment. However, as they acknowledge, 
there is no evidence to back up this claim. No study has ever found that the PCC 
is concerned primarily with motivation, and thus, all they are doing is putting 
forward one possible interpretation of the evidence (which they admit to). 
However, if that’s the case, then an alternative interpretation is just as plausible. 
Instead, it could be that the PCC is the primary neural area generating the 
consequentialist response, and the DLPFC and the IPL are only playing sub-
sidiary roles, perhaps only helping the PCC to construct a moral judgment 
(from a primarily emotional response) and put it forward in a coherent way. Of 
course, I am not suggesting that this is the truth of the matter. I am only 
pointing out that, as far as the neuroscientific evidence suggests, pretty much 
any interpretation of the data is acceptable, including interpretations that fully 
support and fully undermine Greene’s dual-process theory.
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More recently, due to the seemingly conflicting research on VMPFC 
functioning (Bechara et al., 1994; Damasio, 1994; Grabenhorst & Rolls, 
2011; Koenigs & Tranel, 2007; Koenigs et al., 2007; Moll & De Oliveira- 
Souza, 2007; Rangal & Hare, 2010), Greene advocates a slightly different 
understanding of the VMPFC than he does in most of his other work. Based 
on neurological evidence that the VMPFC shows a significant amount of 
activity during purely emotional assessments and even more activity during 
judgments that integrate both emotional and deliberately cognitive assess-
ments, Shenhav and Greene (2014) argue that the VMPFC plays the role of 
integrator when multiple competing inputs are triggered. This would mean 
that when the VMPFC shows activity during a deontological judgment, it is 
not predominately generating an emotional response; it is instead mediating 
the inputs from the other, more primary emotion-based system.
While there is indeed some – albeit tentative – evidence of the VMPFC’s 
integrative role (Grabenhorst & Rolls, 2011; Rangal & Hare, 2010), this does 
not take away from the fact that lesioning of the VMPFC impairs certain 
(very specific) conscious reasoning-based abilities (e.g., decision making, 
planning, and understanding social rules), and there is no prima facie 
reason to believe that damage to an integrating system would have such 
an effect on only those specific abilities and not others. Therefore, yes, the 
VMPFC could be playing an integrative role when subjects make deonto-
logical judgments (which in and of itself is interesting: why would integra-
tion need to occur if a deontological judgment is primarily emotion based?), 
but it is also still a very live possibility that the VMPFC is associated with (at 
least some) conscious reasoning, and perhaps, that reasoning is having an 
effect on generating deontological judgments.
In sum, the neurological evidence is just too nebulous. Thus, while there 
is certainly the possibility that, sometime in the future, we will have 
a sufficiently accurate understanding of the brain to maintain that certain 
neural processing really is only (or at least primarily) conscious reasoning 
based, we are not yet there, and this makes it very difficult for Greene to 
claim that a certain amount of neural processing in specific areas is enough 
to establish the threshold of unfamiliarity*.22,23
However, there is another, potentially more troubling problem lurking 
here. Even if we did have an accurate and nuanced understanding of human 
neural processing, would it be possible to come up with any sort of stan-
dard? While evolutionary biology is currently far from the stage at which it 
could come up with a list of uncontroversial genetic endowments for the 
human species such that problems being addressed by those endowments 
could be classified as genetically unfamiliar*, it’s certainly a theoretical 
possibility.24 However, coming up with a universal standard for what is 
culturally and personally familiar* seems straightforwardly impossible, as 
every person is going to have a different cultural inheritance due to their 
PHILOSOPHICAL PSYCHOLOGY 11
specific personal life history. Consider some of the unfamiliar* moral 
problems that Greene discusses. Could we agree that climate change is 
unfamiliar*? It’s certainly true that this specific moral problem is new in 
the history of our species.25 Thus, we may all have a similar lack of genetic 
inheritance with regard to climate change. However, how we actually 
approach the problem will differ significantly from person to person. One 
person – the daughter of climate scientists – might be raised to always think 
about the importance of the long-term survival of the earth, so for her – due 
to her cultural inheritance and personal life history – the problem is not 
unfamiliar at all. Her friend, however, is a budding philosopher, and while 
he may have thought a bit about what our obligations are to the next 
generations, he hasn’t thought much about climate change specifically. 
Thus, for him, the problem is mildly unfamiliar*. Consider, also, 
a devoutly religious person, a fabulously wealthy person who was raised to 
not think much about future generations, a poor person who never learns to 
read, a person who believes in pagan deities, even a person who believes that 
the earth is on the back of a turtle! Due to the amazing diversity of human 
understanding and belief, this list could go on for hundreds of pages, and 
what that means is that a person will only very rarely approach the problem 
of climate change in the exact same way as another person, and many will 
approach it in significantly different ways. If this is the case, though, then it 
is very difficult to see how there could be a standard of unfamiliarity* (or 
familiarity*) for the problem of climate change.
Some might argue that I am overstating the importance of diversity. Sure, 
there are a certain number of experts that specialize in these problems (e.g., 
bioethicists, religious leaders, climate scientists), but such experts add up to 
a small minority of the population. Thus, for the vast majority of people, 
problems such as climate change will remain unfamiliar* enough to call for 
the use of (a certain amount of) deliberate conscious reasoning. This would 
mean that there would be some exceptions of familiarity* to some of these 
moral problems, but that wouldn’t cause any significant problems for 
Greene’s account.
However, I think that the problem of diversity is much more significant. 
Admittedly, if the moral problems under consideration were very abstract 
and difficult to understand, such as those discussed by metaethicists, then 
there would be a fairly clear line between familiarity* and unfamiliarity*. 
Those that have had sufficient training and experience in metaethics could 
be classified as familiar* with such problems, while those without any 
philosophical training would be at a loss about how to even begin to 
approach such discussions. However, the moral problems under considera-
tion for Greene’s account are not abstract and difficult to understand; they 
are problems that people think about and discuss on a fairly common basis – 
climate change, global terrorism, poverty, bioethics, the role of religion in 
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public life, abortion, stem cell research, the teaching of evolution in public 
schools, the regulation of the financial industry. Almost everyone has spent 
at least some time considering these issues,26 and that means that they will 
have at least some familiarity* with them. Again, though, the specific type of 
familiarity* will differ depending on the person. True, many of them will not 
be considered experts on these issues, but this isn’t important. All that 
matters is that there is such a varying degree of familiarity* both within 
and between populations that it becomes unfeasible to choose a particular 
place to draw a line.
Someone might respond by pointing out that some (perhaps many) of the 
people who have thought about these issues haven’t thought about them in 
a compelling and coherent way (like the experts have), and thus, we can 
classify them as being as unfamiliar* with the issues as someone who really 
knew nothing about them. However, this would be straightforwardly 
untrue, as a person who has considered one of these moral issues is 
familiar with the issue, even if that familiarity hasn’t come about through 
a more formal or academic setting. Indeed, consider the difference between 
a professional bioethicist specializing in end-of-life treatment and a woman 
who is curious about her options once she gets much older and reads 
a handful of books on the topic. Certainly, there is a difference of famil-
iarity* in degree, but it can’t be said that there is a difference in kind. 
Moreover, this way of conceptualizing unfamiliarly* seems destined to 
cause more problems than it’s worth, as Greene would then have to come 
up with some sort of conceptualization of the “correct” type of familiarity, 
and down that road, the threat of arbitrary bias looms large. For instance, 
what makes the expert equipped with particular knowledge and training 
more familiar* with an issue than someone who has personally dealt with 
the issue firsthand but does not have an academic degree in it?
In response to these worries, Greene might claim that he doesn’t need to 
come up with such a standard. Instead, the theory could be implemented on 
a more individual level: if a particular person is not familiar* with a moral 
problem, then she should trust her deliberate conscious reasoning, but if she 
is familiar* with it – due, perhaps, to her cultural upbringing – then she can 
rely more on her automatic settings.
Admittedly, this idea does sound promising at the theoretical level, but 
take a moment to consider how feasible it would be to implement. It would 
mean that people would have to somehow accurately understand and 
measure how familiar* they are with particular moral problems as they 
face them – but how could people come to know such information, espe-
cially in light of the well-known fact that humans are not very good at 
understanding their own mental states and unconscious attitudes?27 Would 
they need to find out from a neuroscientist how much deliberate conscious 
processing their brain is generating when they approach the problem? 
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I suppose that’s a theoretical possibility, but if Greene wants his theory to 
apply to more than just a select few individuals, then he should probably 
avoid this approach.
Thus, it does seem to be important for there to be some sort of standard 
of unfamiliarity*. It would not necessarily need to be universal, as there is 
variability with regard to moral problems across cultures, but Greene would 
need some way to classify certain moral problems as unfamiliar* that at least 
a significant portion of some specific populations could get behind. 
Otherwise, Greene would be stuck with telling people to figure out for 
themselves whether they are familiar* enough with a problem to rely on 
their automatic settings. Not only is this extra step cumbersome and unap-
pealing, it also seems straightforwardly unrealistic in light of already dis-
cussed fact that every moral problem requires both a significant amount of 
automatic processing and at least a small amount of manual processing. 
Indeed, he would be expecting people to search for and find quite a small 
target.
5. Me versus us, us versus them
In the previous sections, I attempted to put forward the most compelling 
understandings of familiarity* and unfamiliarity* that could come out of 
Greene’s discussion in “Beyond Point-and-Shoot Morality.” (Admittedly, he 
does mention one other way we could understand these concepts. In 
particular, he claims that any time there is significant disagreement about 
a moral issue, that indicates that people are having conflicting intuitions 
about the issue, which means that there isn’t enough cultural or genetic 
knowledge to understand the issue clearly, and therefore, the problem 
should probably be classified as unfamiliar* (Greene, 2014, p. 716). 
However, I decided to not address this interpretation because it is so 
problematic that it only weakens Greene’s case. Indeed, not only does the 
objection of cultural and personal diversity apply to it, it is also just 
straightforwardly true that people disagree about all type of problems, 
including familiar* ones.)
However, if we are to turn to some of Greene’s other work – specifically, 
his book Moral Tribes – there is one final way he could potentially define the 
terms in a more technically robust manner.28 In particular, Greene could 
equate familiar* problems to what he calls “Me versus Us” problems, which 
are those concerned with strife between members of the same group 
(Greene, 2013, pp. 98–99, 348, 2017, p. 73). As such conflict was common 
throughout our evolutionary history, it is likely that natural selection 
instilled specific mechanisms to help address it; that is, mechanisms that 
suppress selfish desires and encourage cooperation. One example could be 
the propensity for a group to pool resources to help a sick member. This 
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ability to value the “Us” over the “Me” was certainly likely to enhance the 
survival of the group, and thus, probably can be traced back to evolutiona-
rily ancient origins.
On the other hand, “Us versus Them” problems, which concern conflicts 
between groups, are much more recent, according to Greene. Of course, 
group conflict itself is age old, but because most of our evolutionarily 
instilled mechanisms are tribalistic insofar as they value in-group over out- 
group members, the attempt to value the “Them” over (or at least equal to) 
the “Us” is relatively new in the history of our species. Which is all to say, 
intergroup cooperation is not something that evolution would have selected 
for, and because of this, it’s unlikely that there have been many mechanisms 
instilled to address it.
Could Greene use these two concepts to define familiarity* and unfami-
liarity*? That is, due to the likelihood that evolution equipped us with 
mechanisms to deal with intragroup conflict but not intergroup conflict, 
could he classify problems relating to the former as familiar* and the latter 
as unfamiliar*? If he did take this route, it does seem like it would fit well 
with (at least some of) the examples that he brings up. Greene wants to 
classify climate change, global terrorism, and global poverty as unfamiliar*, 
and while it could be argued that smaller-scale versions of these problems 
are age old (e.g., poverty and the use of resources within a group), the newer 
aspect of needing to address these problems on a global scale through 
intergroup cooperation could lead to them being convincingly classified as 
unfamiliar*. On the other hand, intragroup poverty, disease, exploitation, 
and personal violence only require cooperation within a group and are 
therefore likely to be adequately addressed by instilled mechanisms.
Overall, this seems to be a promising possibility. However, it starts 
running into problems once we consider again the complicated nature of 
cultural and personal familiarity*. As described, if we develop a culturally 
instilled response to a problem that is enough to address the problem, then it 
is no longer unfamiliar*. However, if this is the case, then it becomes much 
more difficult to describe intragroup group problems as familiar* and 
intergroup problems as unfamiliar*. Recall the diversity of cultures, beliefs, 
religions, and viewpoints discussed in Section 4. As each of these belief 
systems has its own view of intergroup conflict and how to solve it, every 
culture will be coming to the intergroup cooperation table with different 
amounts of familiarity*. Admittedly, this would have been less of an issue 
before a few thousand years ago because intergroup cooperation was prob-
ably not a priority then,29 but, now that globalization is part of everyday life, 
it is simply a matter of fact that each belief system has its own way of 
thinking about global problems.
For example, while it might be true that a small minority of isolated 
foraging cultures have never considered the issues of climate change, global 
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terrorism, and global poverty, the vast majority of cultures existing today are 
aware of these issues. Thus, there is already a certain amount of familiarity* 
that is culturally instilled in most populations with regard to these moral 
problems. Of course, different cultures feel differently about how to address 
these problems (e.g., some think we ought to help the poor in other 
countries while others do not), but that doesn’t take away from the fact 
that they have considered (and thus, have become at least somewhat famil-
iar* with) such problems. Due to this, it would be difficult to claim that 
intergroup problems are unfamiliar* in the way Greene’s theory needs them 
to be (i.e., unfamiliar* to the point at which automatic responses would not 
be adequate to address them).
Furthermore, if it is true that cultural influences expose most populations 
to intergroup problems, then that means that people will have thought about 
these issues at least somewhat, and this brings us back to the problem of 
individual-level diversity. Indeed, some people – due to their familial 
upbringing and personal life history – might, for example, be especially 
familiar* with global terrorism but only vaguely familiar* with disease, and 
this would mean that their deliberate conscious reasoning should be used 
with regard to an intragroup problem, as opposed to an intergroup problem. 
Some might want to again argue that this would only result in a few 
exceptions, but this seems very unlikely due to the already mentioned 
influence of globalization. Most people discuss and consider all of the 
moral problems Greene brings up (whether they be intragroup problems 
or intergroup problems), and thus, there is no telling who will end up being 
relatively unfamiliar* with exploitation, who will end up being fairly famil-
iar* with climate change, who will end up being extremely familiar* with 
global poverty, and so on.
Unfortunately for Greene, this problem crops up with every attempt to 
define familiarity*, and it reveals itself to be quite devastating. Is there a way 
to get around it? For example, could Greene just drop the idea of familiarity* 
due to culture and personal life history, and just stick with evolutionarily 
instilled familiarity*? If he did this, then this way of defining familiar* 
problems as “me versus us” and unfamiliar* problems as “us versus them” 
could work. However, it wouldn’t stand up under scrutiny because, at the 
end of the day, if Greene wants to maintain that certain (moral) problems 
are unfamiliar* while others are familiar*, what could plausibly be the 
difference between culturally instilled familiarity* and evolutionarily 
instilled familiarity*? They are both equipping us with the knowledge and 
capability to address a problem, so it is difficult to see how only the latter 
could be classified as familiar*. Indeed, an automatic response is an auto-
matic response. What difference does it make if one comes about through 
the trial-and-error processes of evolution and another through the trial-and 
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-error processes of cultural learning? None at all, it seems, and thus, the 
problem of diversity beleaguers Greene’s second premise until the end.
6. Broader implications
In this article, I outlined what seemed to be the most promising elucidations 
of the concepts of unfamiliarity* and familiarity* in the hope of finding 
a more robust and, ultimately, compelling understanding of the second 
premise of Greene’s unfamiliarity* argument. In so doing, I explored 
some more technical neurological approaches, as well as other more theo-
retical approaches. In the end, however, the problems (especially the pro-
blem of cultural and personal diversity) proved too significant.
To see how this affects Greene’ unfamiliarity* argument, recall the for-
malized version of the argument:
Background model: the dual-process theory of moral judgment, where some moral 
judgments are generated by an automatic, emotion-based system, while others are 
generated by a manual, conscious reasoning-based system.
P1: We ought to trust our manual system more than our automatic system 
when facing unfamiliar* problems.
P2: Many important moral problems are unfamiliar* problems.
P3: Deontological judgments are generated by an emotional neural network, 
while consequentialist judgments are generated by a conscious reasoning 
neural network.
C1: Deontological judgments are an output of our automatic system, while 
consequentialist judgments are an output of our manual system.
C2: We ought to trust our consequentialist judgments more than our 
deontological judgments when making decisions about unfamiliar moral 
problems.
If the concept of unfamiliarity* is incoherent, P2 quickly collapses 
because there is no way to classify a certain group of moral problems as 
unfamiliar* problems. Importantly, though, notice that P1 is also no longer 
tenable. P1 contends that our manual system is more trustworthy than our 
automatic system in certain circumstances, but if Greene is unable to 
compellingly classify or define such circumstances, then there is no longer 
any reason to accept this premise – and if Greene loses P1, he loses his 
“ought,” which, of course, is the key to C2. He can still associate deontolo-
gical judgments with emotion and consequentialist judgments with con-
scious reasoning,30 but he can no longer claim that we ought to trust one of 
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those neural networks (and the judgments generated from it) in a particular 
set of circumstances.
If Greene’s unfamiliarity* argument is no longer tenable, this has impor-
tant implications for his overall project. In “Beyond Point-and-Shoot 
Morality,” Greene puts forward two arguments for why the findings of 
cognitive neuroscience and psychology have implications for ethics. One 
argument is the unfamiliarity* argument (he calls it the “indirect route”), 
which is what I discussed in this article. The other argument (which he calls 
the “direct route,” and can be found in Greene, 2014, pp. 711–713) focuses 
on why the majority of participants choose to sacrifice the one person in the 
‘switch’ dilemma but also choose not to push the large man onto the tracks 
in the ‘footbridge’ dilemma (Greene et al., 2004, 2001).31 According to 
Greene, these two dilemmas are asking the same question (i.e., would you 
sacrifice one to save five?), so the puzzle is why are participants answering 
them in different ways? His explanation is that participants have an (evolu-
tionarily instilled) emotional reaction to the idea of physically pushing the 
man onto the tracks, and this prevents them from advocating the conse-
quentialist judgment even though they normally would choose to sacrifice 
one life to save five.32 Thus, the following normative argument can be put 
forward (cf. Greene, 2010, p. 16; Paulo, 2018, p. 7): 
P1: People’s deontological judgments in response to ‘trolley’ problems are 
strongly influenced by the presence of personal force.
P2: The presence of personal force is morally irrelevant to the moral 
acceptability of actions such as these.
C: People’s deontological judgments in response to ‘trolley’ problems are 
strongly influenced by at least one morally irrelevant factor, personal force, 
and are therefore at least somewhat unreliable.
However, as Kumar and Campbell (2012) point out, this argument is 
unwarranted. Most of us can agree on the idea that the presence or absence 
of personal force is a morally irrelevant factor, so we know that something is 
going wrong somewhere with people’s moral judgments about ‘trolley’ 
dilemmas. However, we cannot know exactly where because it could equally 
well be the case that the consequentialist judgments in the ‘switch’ case 
should be discounted because they are overly sensitive to the impersonal 
nature of the harm. Importantly, Greene (2014, p. 713) himself acknowl-
edges this.33 Thus, the best Greene can do with his “direct route” is this: 
P1: People’s judgments in response to ‘trolley’ problems are strongly influ-
enced by the presence or absence of personal force.
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P2: The presence or absence of personal force is morally irrelevant to the 
moral acceptability of actions such as these.
C: People’s judgments in response to ‘trolley’ problems are strongly 
influenced by at least one morally irrelevant factor, personal force, and are 
therefore at least somewhat unreliable.
While intriguing, this argument doesn’t have any specific normative 
clout. Greene knows this, though, and it seems to be one of the main reasons 
he feels the need to put forward a more general theory that has a further 
reaching normative conclusion (Greene, 2014, p. 713). Enter the unfami-
liarity* argument, which makes claims about which types of (moral) judg-
ments we should trust more broadly. However, if my arguments in this 
article are correct, and the concept of unfamiliarity* is not philosophically 
tenable, then Greene must retreat back to his significantly more limited 
“direct route” that, while interesting, won’t do much to tilt the standoff 
between deontology and consequentialism.
Notes
1. For example, see Greene et al. (2001); Greene (2003), 2008, 2009, Greene (2013), 
2014).
2. The term ‘characteristically’ is important for Greene. To say that a judgment is 
characteristically consequentialist is to say that the judgment is most naturally 
justified by the consequentialist outlook, regardless of the actual reasoning that led 
to the judgment – the same applies for deontological judgments. Therefore, impor-
tantly, it is possible for someone to use deontological reasoning to come to 
a characteristically consequentialist conclusion (Greene, 2014). Of course, this beha-
vioral understanding of consequentialist and deontological judgments is not in line 
with how the concepts are commonly used in the philosophical literature (e.g., see 
note 3), but Greene (2014, p. 699) is careful to acknowledge this. Now, there may be 
significant problems with defining the concepts in this way (such as those pointed out 
in Kahane, 2012; Paulo, 2018), but to discuss them would be outside the scope of this 
article.
3. Of course, this brief explanation doesn’t do justice to the nuances of the deontological 
enterprise. To take just one example, deontology often allows for exceptions, and 
thus, the absolutist tone of this definition is in some ways misleading. However, 
because this is how Greene defines the notion, and it is a good enough definition 
insofar as it emphasizes the primary focus of the deontologist’s enterprise (i.e., the act 
itself, as opposed to its consequences), I will stick with it and refrain from delving into 
the (albeit important) details.
4. A helpful way to see the difference between these two views is through the now 
canonized trolley problem. See note 20 for an explanation.
5. See note 1.
6. I use an asterisk to indicate I am referring to Greene’s technical notion of familiarity 
and unfamiliarity.
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7. From now on, I will drop the term ‘characteristically,’ but it should be understood that 
whenever I refer to consequentialist or deontological judgments, I have Greene’s 
more behavioral understanding of these concepts (discussed in note 2) in mind.
8. The premises of the argument will be laid out in the next section.
9. Importantly, these two systems usually conflict when a person is making a difficult 
moral decision, and it is the “winner” of this conflict that dictates the final decision.
10. Jonathan Haidt (2012) is famous for arguing that almost all moral judgments are 
generated by a system like this.
11. Greene (2014) defines “unfamiliar problems” as ones “with which we have inadequate 
evolutionary, cultural, or personal experience” (p. 714). See the following paragraph.
12. Unfortunately, Greene does not go into any specific detail about what it means for 
a system to be reliable, but we can extrapolate from his argument that reliability 
probably has to do with the ability of a system to generate true beliefs about the world. 
This, however, brings up the (extremely important) question of whether such true 
beliefs accurately track morally true beliefs; that is, whether the practical reliability of 
a neural system has any significant connection to the moral reliability of the system. 
This potential problem hangs over Greene’s entire argument, but as my critique lies 
elsewhere, I will not be discussing it in this article. See Königs (2018) and Paulo (2018) 
for further discussion.
13. For the fully formalized version of the argument, see Section 6.
14. I say ‘perhaps’ because there may well be significant problems with the other 
premises.
15. In his book, he isn’t discussing the notion of (un)familiarity*, but he does describe 
these problems as newer problems that are unique to our modern way of life, so I am 
assuming that Greene would probably classify them as unfamiliar*.
16. Again, this comes from a discussion unrelated to the concept of familiarity*, but these 
seem to fit the bill. They are also all that we are given, as he does not put forward any 
specific examples of familiar* problems in “Beyond Point-and-Shoot Morality.”
17. See the final section for a discussion about how exactly the loss of P2 affects his 
argument.
18. Indeed, one can well imagine that it would be costly and unnecessary for a species that 
relies only on strict instinctual responses to evolve such an ability.
19. I put the qualifier ‘almost’ here because it may be the case that in some rare 
circumstances, the decision is exactly the same, but, in all honesty, I have a difficult 
time imagining such a scenario.
20. The standard ‘switch’ version of the dilemma is where you see that an out-of-control 
trolley is heading toward five people standing on the track. If you flip the lever in front 
of you, the trolley will switch onto a different track with only one person standing on 
it. Do you let the five people die (which would be to make a characteristically 
deontological judgment), or do you pull the lever and cause the trolley to run over 
the one person (which would be to make a characteristically consequentialist judg-
ment)? The ‘footbridge’ version of the trolley dilemma requires pushing a large man 
onto the tracks to stop the trolley from hitting five people.
21. To stick with the driving theme.
22. Of course, this is only a practical defeater, and thus, it still leaves open the possibility 
that we could match familiarity* and unfamiliarity* with specific neurological func-
tioning. However, as this particular attempt at interpreting Greene’s concepts rests 
fundamentally on the possibility of neurological measurement, the impracticality of it 
is important.
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23. Some readers may notice that this discussion of the neurological evidence has 
broader implications. Indeed, if it is true that the research is nebulous in the way 
that I suggest, it casts doubt on not only P3 of Greene’s argument but also the entire 
dual-process theory of moral judgment. Importantly, I do think that such doubt 
should be cast, but as this particular article is focused on P2, it would be outside its 
scope to get into a detailed discussion of its implications for P3 and the background 
model.
24. However, again, this level understanding seems fairly far off, which adds on to the 
methodological worries brought up in the previous paragraphs.
25. Sacrificing our short-term interests for a long-term goal, though, is probably not so 
new. Thus, there is a fundamental aspect of this problem that could be seen as quite 
old. More on this in the next section.
26. Even people in nonindustrialized societies deal with many of these issues (or, at least, 
very similar ones), albeit on a more local scale.
27. For evidence of this well-supported finding in cognitive science, see Gawronski and 
Payne (2010), Mai et al. (2011), and Perkins and Forehand (2012).
28. To be clear, Greene never explicitly maps out this possibility. It is merely 
connecting the dots in an attempt to give the most charitable reading to 
Greene’s notion of unfamiliarity*. Königs (2018) was the first to make this 
connection.
29. Of course, hunter-gatherer groups often engage in alliances with nearby groups, but 
I imagine that, for the most part, such alliances were always in the interest of the 
group itself and would take a backseat if they came into conflict with the priorities of 
the group.
30. Some of the evidence in this article, though, did indirectly call into question this 
association as well (see note 23).
31. For a recap of these dilemmas, see note 20.
32. ‘Normally’ should be understood as something along the lines of “from an abstract, 
removed perspective, unpolluted by emotion.” Of course, this seems to be already 
assuming the consequentialist framework, but as I am only discussing broader 
implications in this section, I’m going to pass over such (admittedly important) 
details.
33. In his own words, “are we oversensitive to personal force in response to footbridge, or 
under-sensitive in response to switch?” (Greene, 2014, p. 713).
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